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In recent years, staggering levels of corruption 
in a wide range of post-confl ict countries 
have caused stabilization and reconstruction 
practitioners to consider whether they need 
to pay more attention to integrity reforms 
in their interventions. In response to this 
growing recognition that the connections 
between corruption, confl ict, and peace 
building need to be better understood, CSRS 
held a workshop on Post-Confl ict Institution 
Building: Beating Corruption from December 
10-13, 2006. More than two dozen panelists 
and participants from nongovernmental 
organizations, intergovernmental organizations, 
government civilian agencies, and the armed 
forces gathered to discuss the challenges 
posed by corruption and the successes and 
shortcomings of anti-corruption efforts in 
post-confl ict settings. 
 
This report represents the author’s 
interpretations of the workshop’s 
primary fi ndings. Participants did not 
formally endorse the list of fi ndings or 
recommendations identifi ed in the report.
About This Event
The Center for Stabilization 
and Reconstruction Studies 
(CSRS) is a teaching institute 
which develops and hosts 
educational programs for stabilization 
and reconstruction practitioners operating 
around the globe. Established by the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 2004 through 
the vision and congressional support of 
Congressman Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS 
creates a wide array of programs to foster 
dialogue among practitioners, as well as help 
them develop new strategies and refi ne best 
practices to improve the effectiveness of their 
important global work.
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes 
to the university’s research and graduate 
degree programs. For more information 
about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, 
please visit www.nps.edu/csrs. 
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In the past decade, the international donor 
community has paid increasing attention 
to fi ghting corruption by enhancing the 
safeguards within their aid programs and 
by pushing recipient governments to enact 
anti-corruption measures. Despite this 
new focus, international actors dedicated 
to the stabilization and reconstruction 
of post-confl ict countries have paid little 
attention to these efforts, leaving the task 
for development actors to address at a 
later stage in the recovery process. This is 
beginning to change, however, as corruption 
has reached stability-threatening proportions 
in a large number of war-torn states, forcing 
the issue onto the post-confl ict agenda in 
cases as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 
In response, the Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School has launched a research 
and education initiative to better equip post-
confl ict practitioners with the mindset and 
insights they need to optimize their work in 
the fi eld. The fi rst activity in this endeavor was 
a workshop entitled Post-Confl ict Institution 
Building: Beating Corruption held December 
11-13, 2006, in Monterey, California. 
CSRS events are designed to bring together 
members of the four primary communities 
involved in stabilization and reconstruction: 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 
government civilian agencies, and the armed 
forces. Post-Confl ict Institution Building: 
Beating Corruption gathered two dozen expert 
participants from these communities. While 
some of the participants were anti-corruption 
specialists, the majority were practitioners in 
the fi eld of stabilization and reconstruction 
who have become increasingly concerned 
about corruption as a result of their work in 
post-confl ict settings. 
Participants identifi ed the following fi ndings 
and recommendations:
•  In a number of post-confl ict settings 
corruption has reached such explosive 
levels that it threatens peace and 
democratic stability. In part, these high 
levels of corruption can be attributed to 
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International actors are changing their approach to fi ghting corruption, realizing 
that postponing integrity measures to later phases of reform may increase the scope 










diminished state and societal capacity, 
lawlessness and violence, and short-term 
horizons generated by political instability 
– factors that are present in many 
developing countries but which are present 
to an even greater degree in post-confl ict 
countries. In addition, factors that are 
largely unique to post-confl ict countries 
– massive international aid, the lingering 
effects of war economies, and the failure of 
peace settlements to weaken illicit power 
structures – are believed to contribute to 
high levels of corruption. 
•  Although analysts agree that the 
aforementioned factors contribute to 
higher levels of corruption in post-confl ict 
cases than in other developing countries, 
a great deal remains unknown about 
the exact manner in which corruption 
increases during the transition from war 
to peace. Civil wars themselves and the 
transitions away from them take many 
shapes and may result in different patterns 
of corruption. Analysts and policy makers 
should be careful to avoid viewing the 
problem of corruption in post-confl ict 
settings in an undifferentiated way and 
treating the challenges of combating 
corruption generically across post-confl ict 
cases. For example, it is likely that petty 
corruption and grand corruption need 
complementary but different responses. 
Similarly, corruption linked to illicit power 
structures may pose different challenges 
and require a different strategy to combat 
it than corruption stimulated by the 
presence of high levels of international aid.
•  In particular, much more needs to be 
learned about the nexus between illicit 
power structures, corruption, and 
confl ict in war-torn countries and how 
these links can be severed. Illicit power 
structures, defi ned by a workshop 
speaker as “entities that seek political 
power through the use of political 
violence often supported by criminal 
economic activity,”1 violate norms for 
political participation through their use 
of violence, challenge the authority of the 
central state and the rule of law, and are 
often the driving force behind corrupt 
activities as they use their illicit wealth to 
bribe offi cials or even more perniciously, 
use their political infl uence or threats of 
violence to divert public assets into their 
own war chests.
•  Actors typically relegate measures to 
control corruption to a second phase 
of reform in post-confl ict settings for 
a variety of reasons. For example, 
these measures are believed to distract 
actors from their primary missions 
or be too diffi cult, destabilizing, and 
culturally inappropriate. Workshop 
participants felt that integrity concerns 
should fi gure more prominently in the 
strategic and operational calculations of 
international actors from the start of their 
interventions. Corruption control should 
be a key objective, albeit one that needs 
to be balanced against other priorities, 
with a cost-benefi ts risk analysis 
conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
•  Reformers should not attempt to 
implement a long wish list of anti-
corruption best practices. Instead, an 
in-depth understanding of the country’s 
context, or situational awareness, 
should inform a strategic analysis of the 
relationship between corruption and 
confl ict and an equally strategic design 
of integrity reforms. This requires that 
reformers develop a methodology for 
assessing the relationship between 
corruption and confl ict in individual 
countries, determine the priority anti-
corruption efforts should be accorded, 
and devise an appropriate response.
•  If actors are to incorporate the 
promotion of integrity into the earliest 
phases of the peacebuilding, stabilization 
and reconstruction agenda, then it 
is essential to determine which anti-
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corruption measures yield short-term 
results, are politically feasible, and have 
a minimum of destabilizing side effects. 
Workshop participants agreed that it 
is possible to score quick wins over 
corruption that contribute directly to the 
legitimacy of the state in post-confl ict 
settings. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, these early victories tend to 
come not from high-profi le prosecutions 
of emblematic individuals or the work of 
anti-corruption commissions, but rather 
from preventive efforts based on state 
monitoring, increased transparency, and 
community empowerment. 
•  Lack of political will among political 
actors is frequently cited as the most 
signifi cant obstacle to integrity reform. 
Despite this obstacle, in most countries 
it is possible to identify key stakeholder 
groups that have incentives to fi ght 
corruption. Workshop participants 
argued that successful anti-corruption 
efforts require an analysis of the incentive 
structures of actors to identify possible 
leverage points for reform.
•  Quick wins with institution building 
– both within government and in the 
community – improve the quality of life 
for ordinary citizens by reducing the petty 
corruption they face on a daily basis, even 
if a great deal of corruption still persists 
elsewhere in the system. Quick wins also 
build public trust in the government by 
demonstrating the authorities’ willingness 
to deal with corruption. There was 
consensus among workshop participants 
that achieving these small gains at the 
local level may help build a constituency 
for additional integrity reforms at the 
national level, although this proposition 
remains largely untested. 
•  Participants identifi ed the need to 
establish a clearinghouse of information 
on anti-corruption work in post-confl ict 
countries. Very little specifi c work 
has been done on this issue, at least 
in terms of documented experience, 
research, and lessons learned. The most 
useful information would go beyond 
a technocratic laundry list of integrity 
reforms and provide some strategic 
analysis and context for action. 
•  Understanding the incentives – or lack 
thereof – that different international 
actors have to address corruption and 
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the potential leverage each wields is 
necessary if anti-corruption initiatives 
are to be incorporated effectively into 
stabilization and reconstruction planning 
and operations. Actors involved in this 
work typically have different purposes, 
motivations, organizational structures, 
and methods of operation which hamper 
coordination and combined action in all 
spheres. Anti-corruption is no exception 
to this rule. In particular, developing an 
understanding of organizational goals 
and incentive structures will be necessary 
to mainstream integrity measures into 
development programs, security sector 
reform initiatives, and post-confl ict 
military planning. 
The findings from the seminar provide an 
agenda for policy research, operational 
innovation, and practitioner education that 
will inform subsequent CSRS workshops 
to be held November 5-7, 2007, and 
sometime during 2008. Information on 
these upcoming workshops will be posted 
on the CSRS web page.
This remainder of this report is divided into 
four parts that summarize the fi ndings and 
recommendations from the conference. Section 
I reviews the factors that may contribute 
to creating a high level of corruption in 
post-confl ict settings. Section II summarizes 
the debate over the extent to which anti-
corruption measures should be incorporated 
into stabilization and reconstruction efforts. 
Section III assesses the effectiveness of anti-
corruption initiatives undertaken in post-
confl ict settings and identifi es a list of lessons 
for building corruption-resistant institutions in 
post-confl ict settings. And Section IV provides 
a series of recommendations to redress the 
gaps that remain in the stabilization and 
reconstruction community’s understanding of 
post-confl ict corruption and, particularly, in its 
capabilities to combat it. 
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Factors Contributing to Corruption 
in Post-Conﬂ ict Settings
Corruption, which can be defi ned as the 
misuse of public offi ce for private gain, is 
an endemic problem in a wide range of 
developing countries at both the administrative 
and elite levels. But it is also becoming more 
common and reaching higher levels in post-
confl ict settings. 2 In part, these high levels of 
corruption can be attributed to diminished 
state and societal capacity, lawlessness and 
violence, and short-term horizons generated by 
political instability – factors that are present 
in many developing countries but which are 
present to an even greater degree in post-
confl ict countries. In addition, factors largely 
unique to post-confl ict countries – massive 
international aid, the lingering effects of 
war economies, and the failure of peace 
settlements to weaken illicit power structures 
– contribute to levels of corruption which, 
under some circumstances, might threaten 
peace and stability. 
Workshop participants discussed how each 
of these factors contributes to corruption. 
In some cases, they noted that practitioners 
needed more information on the links between 
particular factors and corruption to devise 
effective remedies. These factors include:
•  Diminished state capacity: While 
many developing countries suffer from 
ineffective administrative structures, this 
is particularly the case in post-confl ict 
settings where the central state is likely 
to have been greatly weakened during 
the confl ict. In addition, alternative 
power structures may have provided 
critical resources for populations during 
confl ict. The continuing existence of 
these power centers outside of the state 
after the end of violence may undermine 
state authority. Often, the state does 
not have an institutional identity 
independent of the actors who occupy 
key positions; this may mean that the 
state is populated by networks which 
provide for their own in a sectarian, and 
sometimes corrupt, fashion. 
•  Weak civil society: Years of violence 
often lead to weak civil societies 
in many post-confl ict settings. The 
organizations that do exist often 
lend their personnel to the new 
government or engage in the delivery 
of international aid, thus depleting 
the potential supply of organizations 
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A wide array of factors – governmental weakness, violence, and illicit power 
structures among them – create conditions conducive to corruption. If not 
checked, the problem can become systemic, thwarting relief actors’ ability to 
implement effective reforms. 
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to monitor government activities 
and advocate for transparency. In 
addition, years of war often undermine 
the social capital required for 
transparent governance. The lack of 
trust engendered by confl ict creates 
a situation where individual groups 
are prone to use their access to public 
offi ce to provide for their own private 
needs, sometimes in a corrupt fashion. 
Lack of trust in other persons and 
government institutions increases the 
perception that individuals or groups 
are out for themselves; otherwise 
honest individuals are likely to respond 
in kind simply to survive.
•  Lawlessness and violence: The general 
impunity created by lawlessness and 
violence diminishes the deterrent effect 
that helps to prevent corruption in other 
settings. The use of violence against 
those who would fi ght corruption 
similarly undermines the building of 
corruption-resistant institutions. 
•  Short-time horizons: According to 
the World Bank, nearly half of all 
post-confl ict countries return to war 
within fi ve years of signing a peace 
agreement. 3 In practice, the likelihood 
of a lasting peace may seem even more 
remote to the inhabitants of a war-torn 
country, thus reinforcing the short-time 
horizons that fuel corrupt behavior. In 
short, the concern that violence may 
return can create an “I need to get 
what I can now” pathology in post-
confl ict environments. 
•  Massive international aid: Over 
the past decade, donors have paid 
increasing attention to preventing 
corruption in their aid delivery. 
Nonetheless, there was a general 
feeling among workshop participants 
that donors have not done enough to 
lead by example and improve their 
own integrity and accountability 
standards and practices, especially in 
post-confl ict cases. In addition, the 
international community violates the 
fundamental “do no harm” principle by 
contributing to corruption with their 
intervention. Reconstruction funds are 
particularly vulnerable to corruption, 
The concern that violence 
may return can create an 
“I need to get what I can now” 
pathology in post-confl ict 
environments.
Dr. Laina Reynolds Levy 
of the Partners for 
Democratic Change 
(pictured in foreground) 
and other participants 
listen to a presenter.
given the general prevalence of suspect 
practices in the construction sector 
and the pressure donors face to deliver 
quickly on high visibility infrastructure 
projects. 4 The post-confl ict specialists 
in attendance were particularly critical 
of a quick-win mentality that has 
not only failed to yield short-term 
victories but has often proved to be 
counter-productive by precluding early 
attention to institution building and 
by creating exaggerated expectations 
that are impossible to fulfi ll. The 
infl ated wages and prices for goods that 
international actors pay were blamed 
for undermining the development of 
state capacity and adding to excessive 
expectations in the local population – 
both of which contribute to corruption. 
Those left out of the aid bonanza may 
feel justifi ed engaging in corruption to 
secure similar levels of compensation. 
•  War economies, peace settlements, 
and illicit power structures: In 
recent decades, confl icts have been 
increasingly self-fi nanced through 
combatant exploitation of black 
markets and natural resources, creating 
special challenges for peacebuilding. 
Combatants may have little incentive 
to seek peace since they are profi ting 
from war. In cases where a peace 
settlement has been achieved, former 
combatants are often well-positioned 
to maintain their privileged positions. 
Peace frequently does not bring an end 
to the illicit economy. Wealth from this 
economy, along with military might, 
continues to be important sources of 
power in the emerging political and 
economic systems. These illicit power 
structures infi ltrate the state and 
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According to the World Bank, nearly 
half of all post-confl ict countries 
return to war within fi ve years of 
signing a peace agreement.
Karen Hussmann, 
a United Nations 
Development 
Programme consultant, 
speaks to the group 
about her experiences 
in Afghanistan.
democratic institutions, corrupting 
politicians or seeking political offi ce for 
their leaders and allies to nourish their 
informal networks of infl uence. 
Although illicit power structures often play 
a central role in uninstitutionalized war-
torn states, the international community 
has largely failed to address these actors in 
a strategic way. 5 In some cases, promoting 
privatization without implementing 
appropriate regulations and safeguards 
has allowed these actors to entrench 
themselves in the new economic system. In 
other cases, the international community 
engages these actors during peace talks, 
buying off potential “peace spoilers” by 
permitting their continued participation in 
corrupt activities. This may be an explicit 
realpolitik strategy that accepts corruption 
as a cost of peace or it may be a by-product 
of the international community’s inability 
to devise a strategy to marginalize these 
actors. Either way, the peace process creates 
“governance spoilers” whose perversion of 
democracy and undermining of the state 
can threaten the whole transition. 
While participants highlighted the 
possible ways the above factors contribute 
to corruption in post-conflict settings, a 
great deal remains unknown about the 
exact manner through which corruption 
usually increases during the transition 
from war to peace. Civil wars themselves 
and the transitions away from them take many 
shapes and may result in different patterns 
of corruption. Analysts and policy makers 
should be careful to avoid viewing the problem 
of corruption in post-confl ict settings in an 
undifferentiated way and treating the challenges 
of combating corruption generically across 
post-confl ict cases. For example, it is likely 
that petty corruption and grand corruption 
need complementary but different responses. 
Similarly, corruption linked to illicit power 
structures may pose different challenges and 
require a different strategy to combat it than 
corruption stimulated by the presence of high 
levels of international aid. 
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Pictured from left to right: 
Lieutenant General (Ret.) 
Robert Ord, III, Dean of 
the School of International 
Graduate Studies, NPS; 
Sam Farr, US House of 
Representatives (CA-17); 
Matthew Vaccaro, Program 
Director, CSRS; and an aide 
to Congressman Farr.
Analysts of post-confl ict corruption have 
noted that the same factors that increase 
the danger of corruption in post-confl ict 
settings may also create a unique but fl eeting 
opportunity to prevent and even undercut 
corruption. 6 Large amounts of aid may 
provide leverage for international actors 
interested in promoting integrity, while the 
fl uidity of the immediate post-confl ict setting 
might facilitate the sidelining of corrupt elites. 
Despite these conditions, international actors 
have not taken advantage of this potential 
window of opportunity, giving short shrift to 
anti-corruption concerns in their stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts. 
Workshop participants discussed the reasons 
most commonly given for relegating integrity 
measures to a second phase of reform in 
post-confl ict settings. They agreed that while 
the arguments may have merit under certain 
circumstances, there is also ample evidence 
that neglecting anti-corruption efforts during 
initial stabilization and reconstruction efforts 
can be destabilizing. 
Consequently, workshop participants felt 
that integrity concerns should fi gure more 
prominently in the strategic and operational 
calculations of international actors from 
the start of their interventions. Corruption 
control should be a key objective, albeit 
one that needs to be balanced against 
other priorities, with a cost-benefi ts risk 
analysis conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
Reformers should not attempt to implement 
a long wish list of anti-corruption best 
practices. Instead, an in-depth understanding 
9
Prioritizing Anti-Corruption Efforts
While international actors have typically postponed anti-corruption measures to 
later stages of reform, there is a growing belief in the community that early action 
may allow actors to prevent and even undercut corruption.
Workshop participants believed 
that integrity concerns should fi gure 
more prominently in the strategic 
and operational calculations of 
international actors. 
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Reasons Actors Give for Delaying 
Implementation of Integrity Measures
Reason 
 Fighting corruption is a worthy long-
term objective, but overwhelmed 
reformers need to devote their time and 
energy in the short run to more pressing 
needs, like the delivery of humanitarian 
aid, reconstruction of infrastructure, 
and provision of security. From this 
perspective, the diversion of some funds 
is the necessary price to pay for the quick 
and effective delivery of assistance. Any 
time or energy spent on anti-corruption 
efforts detracts from completion of the 
primary stabilization and reconstruction 
mission. In contrast, participants 
stressed the ways in which corruption 
thwarts the accomplishment of the more 
pressing short-run objectives pursued by 
reformers. Humanitarian aid does not 
reach its intended recipients, shoddily 
constructed infrastructure crumbles, 
and corrupt police forces contribute 
to increased levels of insecurity. Of 
equal importance, public perceptions of 
corruption undermine the legitimacy of 
international actors and the state. 
Reason
Fighting corruption is simply too 
difficult an undertaking in the short 
run. According to this view, corruption 
is so widespread and ingrained that 
short-term victories are unlikely. Given 
this perspective, it makes little sense to 
spend time – or precious resources – 
on near-term anti-corruption activities. 
While participants acknowledged that 
fighting corruption is a daunting task 
that will undoubtedly require long-term 
efforts to build institutions and change 
norms, they stressed that quick 
wins are possible. (See Assessing 
Anti-Corruption Efforts on page 13 
for more information.) In addition, 
if integrity reforms are put off to 
the future, they may become much 
more difficult to carry out as corrupt 





Integrity reforms may be destabilizing if 
they threaten the economic and political 
interests of key parties to the peace 
settlement. Although this is a legitimate 
concern, workshop participants cautioned 
that paying off “peace spoilers” by 
permitting the continuation of corrupt 
activities can result in the creation of 
“governance spoilers” which undermine 
the legitimacy of the new state and 
perhaps the entire peace process. In 
hindsight, this raises the question of 
whether international actors might have 
been able to seek peace and stability 
without engaging in deals, whether formal 
peace settlements or ad hoc alliances with 
warlords, that contributed to spiraling 
levels of corruption. This requires 
some counterfactual reasoning but also 
an exploration of cases, if any exist, 
where reformers have been successful 
in confronting entrenched interests and 
preventing corruption. 
Reason 
Integrity reforms are culturally 
inappropriate in countries where 
traditional, patron-client relationships 
prevail and Western, post-modern notions 
of the distinction between the public and 
the private are absent. According to this 
view, anti-corruption efforts are, at best, a 
waste of energy since corruption is widely 
accepted. At worst, they may tear apart 
the social fabric, undermining informal 
social networks that fulfi ll important 
needs in the absence of a functioning 
state. Although there is no universal 
agreement on where the line should be 
drawn in determining corrupt activities, 
even in the developed world, participants 
argued that a great deal of the corruption 
that does take place in post-confl ict 
settings – especially grand corruption – is 
widely condemned by country inhabitants. 
To the extent petty corruption is accepted, 
this is usually not a product of traditional 
values but rather the need to survive and 
the inability to imagine and operationalize 
a different way of doing things. External 
actors can help local actors change such 
a system, thus greatly improving the 
quality of their daily life. Finally, to the 
extent that corrupt networks are part of 
the social fabric, their targeting should 
be carefully considered. This should not 
prevent reformers from embarking on 
transformative anti-corruption campaigns, 
but these campaigns should be undertaken 
with a full understanding of the challenges 
they will face as well as the possible 
consequences of successful efforts. 
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of country context, or situational awareness, 
should inform a strategic analysis of the 
relationship between corruption and confl ict 
and ensuring an equally strategic design of 
integrity reforms. 
Toward this end, actors need to devote 
more energy to understanding the kinds 
and levels of corruption that threaten 
the transition to peace and stability in 
a given country. Under what conditions 
does corruption reach a tipping point? Are 
certain kinds of corruption more disruptive 
than others? For example, corruption in the 
judicial system might be judged a priority, 
given the sector’s impact on so many 
dimensions of transition, including the 
average citizen’s confi dence in the political 
system, business willingness to invest in the 
country, and the success of security sector 
reforms. At the same time, policy makers 
need to understand how, and which, anti-
corruption efforts are likely to reinforce or 
undermine their goals of stabilization and 
reconstruction in the short run. A primer on 
this issue follows.
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Participants discuss best 
practices for mitigating 
corruption in post-conﬂ ict 
environments. 
Assessing Anti-Corruption Efforts
If the promotion of integrity is to be 
incorporated into the earliest phases of the 
peacebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction 
agenda, then it is essential to determine which 
anti-corruption measures yield short-term results, 
are politically feasible, and have a minimum of 
destabilizing side effects. Accordingly, workshop 
participants reviewed anti-corruption initiatives 
– ranging from international and regional 
standard setting to national-level anti-corruption 
commissions to community-based monitoring 
– in an effort to identify lessons for effective 
institution building. They found that while a 
number of the most commonly recommended 
approaches are incomplete, ineffective, or even 
counter-productive, it is possible to score quick 
wins over corruption that contribute directly 
to the legitimacy of the state in post-confl ict 
settings. Contrary to conventional wisdom, these 
early victories tend to come not from high-
profi le prosecutions of emblematic individuals 
but rather from preventive efforts based on 
state monitoring, increased transparency, 
and community empowerment. Punitive law 
enforcement approaches were often less effective, 
as lack of political will and weak judiciaries 
undermined their deterrent effect. 
A. Why Implementing Standards 
and Legal Frameworks Is 
Necessary but Insufﬁ cient 
Actors have made great strides in the past 
decade to establish codes of conducts and 
legal norms censoring corruption, within 
both the private and public sectors. Examples 
include the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Anti-
Bribery Convention, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, and the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption. OECD’s 
Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) 
has worked hard for the passage of national 
frameworks refl ecting these international 
norms in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, including the post-confl ict cases of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. The prospect 
of European Union membership has been an 
important carrot to guarantee passage, if not 
always enforcement, of appropriate legislation.7 
In post-confl ict settings like Afghanistan where 
former combatants or warlords populate 
the legislature and executive ministries, it is 
diffi cult to accomplish this goal. Elsewhere, the 
challenge is ensuring that the norms are actually 
enforced and do not remain paper tigers.
By fi ghting corruption, international actors can score quick wins that contribute 
to the legitimacy of the new order. The most effective way to accomplish this is 
through preventive measures based on state monitoring, increased transparency, 
and community empowerment. 
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B. Enforcement Approach: 
Fewer Quick Wins than Expected
Many workshop participants questioned the 
primary emphasis international donors place 
on a law enforcement approach to corruption 
in post-confl ict settings where investigative 
and judicial capacity is typically quite low. 
In theory, the successful prosecution of a 
few emblematic individuals for corruption 
should send the signal that graft is a high-risk 
activity that will not be tolerated. In practice, 
however, few individuals are indicted and even 
fewer convicted. Failed investigations signal 
that corrupt individuals are above the law, 
increasing cynicism within the general public. 
The enforcement approach is also highly 
vulnerable to politicization at both the local 
and national levels, as political fi gures level 
corruption charges at their rivals. While a law 
enforcement approach is a necessary part of any 
comprehensive anti-corruption efforts, in most 
cases it has not delivered the early victories that 
many had hoped. To be effective, it must be 
accompanied by a greater emphasis on judicial 
reform early on.
C. Anti-Corruption Commissions 
Are Often Ineffective 
Experts overwhelmingly agree that anti-
corruption commissions have for the most part 
proven ineffective in fi ghting corruption in 
developing countries. 8 These institutions lack 
a minimum of organizational capacity, have 
limited political backing, and are vulnerable to 
becoming corrupt themselves. They are asked to 
carry out investigations of high-level corruption 
that are complex and diffi cult undertakings 
even in developed countries and to bear the 
administrative burden of creating registries of 
assets that have little practical use.9 Says one 
expert: “Primary systems [such as chief fi nancial 
offi cers within line ministries] should be in place 
before secondary bodies, like anti-corruption 
commissions, look to see whether these systems 
are working.” 10 Workshop participants echoed 
this sentiment, stressing the need for the 
mainstreaming of anti-corruption measures 
within government ministries. 
D. Why Building Government 
Capacity Is Critical
International aid agencies have struggled to 
fi nd ways to prevent the diversion of aid money 
in countries where government capacity and 
administrative accountability is low. They 
recognize that approaches which bypass 
existing state ministries do little to contribute to 
the building of corruption-resistant indigenous 
institutions. The governance efforts of many 
international institutions seek to increase the 
competence of line and sectoral ministries, 
while rule of law initiatives attempt to do the 
same for the judiciary and police. Workshop 
participants stressed the need for more support 
to these ongoing efforts, but emphasized that 
they should include explicit anti-corruption 
dimensions. For example, judicial reform 
requires specifi c attention to ethics training 
for judges, while educational and health 
sector reforms might include transparency 
measures and the empowering of user groups 
to monitor service delivery. As the next 
section illustrates, efforts to build corruption-
resistant governmental institutions are often 
complemented by the empowerment of civil 
society organizations. 
E. Quick Wins with Transparency, 
State Monitoring, and 
Community Empowerment
The promotion of transparency has long been 
a mainstay of anti-corruption proposals. The 
World Bank frequently cites experimental 
studies that show the importance of 
transparency in encouraging honest behavior 
in a wide range of cultures. For example, the 
number of individuals saying they would return 
an envelope of money found on the fl oor of 
a parking garage increases dramatically, from 
one-third of respondents to three-quarters, 
when there is just a 30% possibility that a video 
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camera is in the garage. 11 At the workshop, 
a former offi cial in Afghanistan’s Ministry of 
Finance provided a related anecdote, noting 
that a closed process of bidding for road 
construction led to a winning bid of 2.9 million 
per kilometer. When the bidding was repeated 
under more transparent procedures, the cost of 
construction fell to 1.1 million per kilometer.
Under the right circumstances, making 
information available about the procedures 
and substance of government can empower 
community groups to hold local offi cials and 
elites accountable and reduce corruption. For 
example, posting information at local schools 
indicating the amount of money provided by 
the national government can lead to an increase 
in the actual allocation of funds by local leaders. 
Providing cross-border traders with data on 
the legitimate fees border guards are entitled to 
charge can give locals leverage in their dealing 
with corrupt government offi cials. In an US 
Agency for International Development-funded 
project in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), information was key to mobilizing users 
against low-level corruption on the waterways 
and to enabling their resistance. Innovative 
Resources Management (IRM), a US non-
profi t organization, analyzed tracasseries on 
the waterways and found that 94% of the 
locally-collected administrative fees either 
were not authorized by law or were pocketed 
by the agents. 12 This objective information 
about the economic costs of corruption helped 
create outrage and catalyze action against a 
practice which heretofore had largely been 
accepted as a way of life. Users were organized 
into committees against corruption and armed 
with print-outs of permitted fees and access to 
public high-frequency radios that promoted 
transparency and facilitated networking with 
one another and with allied offi cials in the 
Ministry of Interior who were monitoring the 
situation and sanctioning corrupt local agents. 
The success of the project in the DRC suggests 
that an information-based approach that 
empowers grassroots, functional organizations 
is feasible in even the most corrupt and confl ict-
ridden society. Key to the success of that project 
was an understanding of the incentives that 
motivated individuals to mobilize against 
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corruption. Another crucial ingredient for 
success was identifying stakeholders in the 
national government – high offi cials in the 
Ministry of Interior who had a vested interest 
in the situation and could use their power and 
authority to leverage change. 
F. Incentive Structures and Leverage 
Points for Reform
Lack of political will is frequently cited as 
the most signifi cant obstacle to integrity 
reform. Despite this, in most countries it is 
possible to identify key stakeholder groups 
with incentives to fi ght corruption. Workshop 
participants argued that successful anti-
corruption efforts require an analysis of 
the incentive structures of actors to identify 
possible leverage points for reform.
In many of the examples cited at the 
workshop, the local community groups 
that participated in anti-corruption efforts 
were often user groups with a direct stake 
in reducing corruption. In some cases, the 
groups were well aware of how corruption 
undermined their interests and were prepared 
to act after being equipped with information 
(for example, appropriate fees). In other cases, 
such as the Congo waterways example, some 
consciousness-raising was necessary: IRM 
sought to quantify the costs of corruption 
to shake the people out of complacency. 
By linking the fi ght against corruption to 
practical, economic welfare concerns such as 
the provision of food and regional economic 
growth, IRM was able to gain support from 
a wide range of actors in civil society and 
government for the anti-corruption efforts. 
In this way, grassroots groups were linked to 
offi cials in the Ministry of Interior who had a 
shared interest in reducing corruption as part 
of their interest in increasing tax revenues 
and economic growth. As this example 
demonstrates, even in the most corrupt 
systems, there are individual ministers and 
ministries with an institutional interest in 
pursuing integrity reform. The challenge is to 
identify and engage these “islands of integrity.”
It is important to note that user groups do not 
have an automatic interest in monitoring all 
types of corruption; incentives must be analyzed 
rather than assumed. For example, a study of 
road construction in Indonesia showed that 
community groups effectively monitored funds 
meant for wages, but did not prevent corruption 
in the materials procurement process, even 
though the groups had more information on the 
latter than the former. 13 Presumably, the quality 
of roads resulting from the project was a public 
good that presented collective action problems 
for the monitoring groups. 
Frequently, media campaigns denouncing 
the evils of corruption are used to create the 
incentives or political will to carry out integrity 
reforms. By creating public awareness of the 
problem, the campaigns hope to motivate citizen 
participation in oversight groups and create 
pressure on politicians to address the issue. These 
campaigns seem to work best where specifi c 
practices are targeted and/or where the newly 
created incentives to fi ght corruption can be 
channeled effectively. For example, in Nicaragua, 
a media campaign to reduce pensions and perks 
of retired presidents and top offi cials led to 
the introduction of new legislation. In the case 
of the DRC above, quantitative information 
on the harmfulness of tracasseries created 
outrage among the population, but the key to 
success was channeling public response into 
organizations which were equipped with the 
right resources to combat the problem. In the 
Indonesian road project study, community 
groups had the most leverage in combating 
corruption in districts where local offi cials face 
more competitive elections. 14 
In contrast, media campaigns that denounce 
corruption in more general terms can 
raise public awareness of the problem but 
also increase frustration if no remedy is 
forthcoming. In these cases, the increased 
awareness of corruption often serves merely 
to increase public distrust of government. The 
resulting “throw the bums out” sentiment can 
be exploited repeatedly by challengers to oust 
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incumbents, thus contributing to the political 
instability that is a breeding ground for 
corruption. To make matters worse, politicians 
elected on anti-corruption platforms often 
show little commitment to their campaign 
promises upon assuming offi ce or use anti-
corruption prosecutions only to pursue their 
political opponents. 
G. The Broader Implications of Quick 
Wins in Building Public Trust and a 
Constituency for Reform
The desire for quick wins in post-confl ict 
settings often takes the form of an urge to spend 
or, in the case of anti-corruption, to prosecute. 
Workshop participants were critical of these 
approaches which often failed to accomplish 
their goals. As one US civil-affairs offi cer who 
worked in Iraq put it: “We spent money to win 
friends and infl uence people. But as soon as 
the money was gone, so were our friends.” In 
many cases, the pursuit of quick wins had the 
opposite of its intended effect, undermining 
public trust in government by creating 
expectations about improvements in daily life 
that were subsequently dashed by 
shoddily executed reconstruction projects, the 
incompetence of corrupt police forces, and 
other exemplars of government corruption. 
In contrast, the quick wins based on institution 
building – both within government and in 
the community – improve the quality of life 
for ordinary citizens by reducing the petty 
corruption they face on a daily basis, even if a 
great deal of corruption still persists elsewhere 
in the system. Given the dire situation facing 
most ordinary citizens, workshop participants 
felt that anti-corruption efforts in sectors like 
health, education, and policing which improve 
the basic quality of life were most important in 
the short run. In addition, since the local groups 
involved in many of the monitoring efforts were 
not anti-corruption groups per se but functional 
organizations or local governance structures, 
their strengthening should have a positive 
spillover effect on other development and 
democracy goals. 
Quick wins also build public trust in the 
government by demonstrating the authorities’ 
willingness to deal with corruption. In some 
cases, credible efforts to increase ethical 
behavior in government increased public trust 
even when it was unclear whether the reforms 
reduced corruption. Dr. Laina Reynolds Levy 
reported on a project in Kosovo where her 
non-governmental organization, Partners 
for Democratic Change, worked with 
municipal inspectors for three months to 
develop a widely accepted Code of Ethics 
for Inspectors.15 After the adoption of the 
code, inspectors reported greater professional 
pride and citizens reported increased trust in 
municipal government. This suggests that local 
and grassroots measures addressing corruption 
should be publicized, especially since they are 
much less likely to receive media attention 
than high-profi le prosecutions. 
There was also a sense among workshop 
participants that quick wins at the local level 
may help build a constituency for additional 
integrity reforms at the national level, 
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particularly in the area of grand corruption 
which has posed such a challenge for 
both developing and developed countries. 
Additional research is needed on the links 
between administrative and grand corruption 
and policymakers should seek innovative 
ways to develop links between anti-
corruption efforts at both levels. 
H. Donor Practices
While international aid agencies have worked 
on preventing corruption in their own 
aid programs, this often focuses more on 
accountability to home governments rather 
than to local populations. The experience 
of international donors after the Asian 
tsunami, however, suggests that the lessons on 
transparency, accountability, and community 
empowerment which are the key to quick wins 
domestically can also be applied to donor 
practices. In that case, physical reconstruction 
and institution building were pursued 
simultaneously by donors who realized their 
success would be measured by the ability to 
deliver aid not only quickly but effectively. 16 
International donors involved local leaders, 
women’s groups, and other NGOs in both the 
design and implementation of aid programs. 
Country-owned websites provided information 
on procurement contracts and bidders, as 
well as aid recipients, and mechanisms were 
created whereby local groups could provide 
feedback. These well-publicized monitoring 
efforts and random audits helped to increase 
the accountability of international and national 
actors. Importantly, these oversight institutions 
were incorporated in donor programs – and 
budgets – from the start. 
Despite the priority some international agencies 
assign to anti-corruption goals, the general 
neglect of this issue in post-confl ict settings 
indicates that problems of political will are 
not limited to domestic actors. Awareness 
campaigns are necessary within the international 
community, as is gaining an understanding of the 
incentives and leverage different actors have to 
undertake integrity reforms.
I. The Military
The lessons identifi ed for donors apply 
equally to the military, which has become 
increasingly involved in supporting 
governance in a range of post-confl ict 
settings. This is particularly the case in 
countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, where 
civil affairs teams work with civilian agencies 
and community groups in an effort to deliver 
aid and reconstruct local governance. In 
addition, strategic decisions to engage corrupt 
actors in the pursuit of security goals need to 
be balanced against the increasing evidence of 
harm caused by such alliances. 
J. Confronting Illicit Power Structures 
Remains a Formidable Challenge
Efforts to advance development and 
governance in general, and anti-corruption 
efforts specifi cally, have placed a great deal 
of emphasis on increasing government 
capacity or empowering civil society. Much 
less attention has been paid to a third group 
of actors – illicit power structures – that 
often undermines peace, development, and 
democracy. 17 This is beginning to change 
as analysts and policymakers acknowledge 
the fundamental challenges posed by 
these actors. 18 The US State Department’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement has recently spearheaded 
a fi ght against kleptocracy, intended to 
deny corrupt actors safe havens and access 
to international banking institutions. 19 
This law enforcement approach should 
be complemented by a comprehensive 
strategy that addresses issues such as the 
transformation of war economies and 
the political economy of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration. 
Recommendations
Based on the workshop fi ndings, participants 
made a number of recommendations 
for future policy research, operational 
innovation, and practitioner education.
Study the intervention of the international 
community in post-conﬂ ict countries 
to determine how it affects corruption and 
how corruption affects its various goals. Are 
integrity and accountability standards set and 
pursued effectively? To what extent does the 
distortion of local markets and heightened 
expectations affect integrity in the society? 
To what extent were the primary goals of 
security, peace, and delivery of humanitarian 
and reconstruction aid negatively affected 
by corruption, or conversely, aided by anti-
corruption efforts? 
•  In what ways, and how frequently, do peace 
settlements and other strategic decisions 
to secure peace affect corruption levels 
and consequently, the overall goals of 
stabilization and reconstruction? 
•  What is the relationship between illicit 
power structures and the embedded 
networks of corruption that imperil 
governance and democratic stability? 
How often does the buying off of 
“peace spoilers” lead to entrenched illicit 
power structures? In contrast, to what 
extent does the failure to buy off former 
combatants – i.e., poorly implemented 
or under-resourced demobilization and 
reintegration efforts – contribute to the 
continuation of illicit power structures 
populated by out-of-work soldiers? What 
lessons can be learned from post-confl ict 
cases which have escaped the scourge 
of corruption linked to illicit power 
structures? Do existing anti-corruption 
reforms effectively target these power 
structures? 
•  What kinds of corruption are most 
threatening to peace and stability? 
Establish a clearinghouse of information 
on anti-corruption work in post-conﬂ ict 
countries. Very little specifi c work has 
been done on this issue, at least in terms of 
documented experience, research and lessons 
learned. 20 The most useful information would 
Workshop participants developed a number of recommendations to help improve 
anti-corruption initiatives. Chief among them: development of a methodology for 
assessing the relationship between corruption and confl ict, increased attention to 
the incentives for behavior and the leverage wielded by key actors, and establishment 
of a clearinghouse for information and best practices. 
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go beyond a technocratic laundry list of 
integrity reforms and provide some strategic 
analysis and context for action. 
In addition to identifying which kinds of 
integrity reforms are effective and feasible, 
participants also expressed an interest in 
seeing analyses of the following issues: 
•  How can the much-needed law 
enforcement approach to combating 
corruption be reconceived to enhance 
its effectiveness and reduce the negative 
side effects of politicization and 
public cynicism? 
•  What is the relationship between anti-
corruption efforts at the micro level 
and efforts at the intermediate and 
macro levels? Can micro level successes 
provide the impetus for reform at the 
national level? Can success at the lower-
level help unravel larger networks of 
illicit infl uence, or are these successes 
only possible to the extent they do not 
harm other interests? Answers to these 
questions will depend on more research 
and creative initiatives from the donor 
side to foster linkage between the levels 
and create spaces for dialogue.
Develop a methodology for assessing 
the relationship between corruption 
and conﬂ ict in individual countries and 
designing an appropriate response. 
Participants stressed the need for situational 
awareness of country circumstances that 
would help determine both the priority anti-
corruption efforts should be accorded as well 
as which integrity measures would be most 
effective and feasible.
These comprehensive country assessments from 
the anti-corruption angle should include an 
analysis of the political economy of corruption 
(e.g., stakeholders and distribution of formal, 
informal and military powers with particular 
emphasis on illicit power structures), geopolitical 
context and interests of foreign countries, 
cultural norms, beliefs, and perceptions 
about corruption, as well as an analysis of 
governmental capacity to fi ght corruption. 
Devising such a methodology raises a number 
of issues and possibilities:
•  How should this corruption-focused 
assessment be integrated with existing 
confl ict assessments? 
•  Do traditional methodologies for 
measuring corruption need to be modifi ed 
for post-confl ict settings? How might 
public opinion surveys be modifi ed to 
account for key aspects of post-confl ict 
corruption? Do new measures need to be 
devised to capture the central role that 
illicit power structures may play in fuelling 
corruption, particularly grand corruption, 
in post-confl ict settings? 
•  Prevailing approaches for analyzing 
government capacity, which focus on 
the transparency of institutions, should 
be complemented by an analysis of the 
incentive structures actors face in adopting 
and implementing integrity reforms and 
leverage points. 
•  An in-depth understanding of the shadowy 
issue of corruption requires fi nding a way 
to tap into the extensive, but underutilized 
knowledge of country conditions resident 
in development agencies and in-country 
sources. Developing this capability would 
benefi t all actions by international actors 
and not just their anti-corruption efforts. 
•  This diagnostic enterprise might 
provide a starting point for strategic 
coordination among the diverse actors 
in the international community. The 
analysis could be carried out jointly by 
international and domestic actors or by 
one agency on behalf of others. While 
coordinated action may not result, such 
an approach could help create a shared 
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understanding of the problem or at least 
shared language for characterizing the 
situation. The experience of the Asian 
Development Bank and other international 
actors in tsunami relief efforts might 
provide a model for this approach. 
Analyze the incentives — or lack thereof 
— that different international actors 
have to address corruption and the 
potential leverage each wields. The 
diverse set of actors involved in stability and 
reconstruction operations typically have 
different purposes, motivations, organizational 
structures, and methods of operation which 
present challenges of coordination and 
combined action in all spheres, and anti-
corruption is no exception. An understanding 
of organizational goals and incentive 
structures will be necessary to carry out the 
following imperatives:
•  Incorporate anti-corruption issues 
into the strategic planning process 
for stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. This needs to be done in a 
way that prevents organizational funding 
streams, spending pressures, missions, 
rivalries, and biases from undermining 
anti-corruption initiatives.
•  Mainstream an anti-corruption 
perspective into all initiatives. Build the 
will and capacity of sectoral specialists, 
like health and education providers, to 
incorporate anti-corruption measures 
into their programs. Anti-corruption 
measures should also be a key part of 
security sector reform.
•  Integrate anti-corruption concerns into 
post-confl ict military planning. This 
would include considering how strategies 
to pursue security both affect levels of 
corruption and might be affected by 
corruption; planning for military support 
to law enforcement where appropriate, 
particularly in settings where illicit 
power structures threaten governability; 
and incorporating strategies for building 
corruption-resistant institutions into the 
training received by civil-affairs teams.
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Post-Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption. 
12  Michael Brown, “A Model for Combating Corruption 
Hands On: Lessons from the Congo and Potential for 
Replicability in Africa and Beyond,” presentation at 
the CSRS workshop on Post-Conflict Institution Build-
ing: Beating Corruption.
13  Benjamin A. Olken, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” National Bureau 
of Economic Research, October 2005. The threat of an 
audit from national authorities was effective in reducing 
corruption in materials, reinforcing the importance of 
building anti-corruption components (such as audits) into 
development programs.
14  Olken, 2005.
15  Dr. Laina Reynolds Levy, Partners for Democratic 
Change, presentation at the CSRS workshop on Post-
Conflict Institution Building: Beating Corruption. 
16  Brent Dark, Asian Development Bank, presentation at 
the CSRS workshop on Post-Conflict Institution Building: 
Beating Corruption.
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